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I. Introduction
In 2012, the Texas Supreme Court held that a state law imposing a cap
on groundwater pumping, and denying all but a small domestic allotment to 
overlying landowners who had not pumped previously, was effectively a 
constitutional taking of the non-pumping landowner’s property in the 
groundwater under its land.1  The decision has been widely noted and 
sharply criticized on two related grounds: first, the view that there is an 
extant property right in un-pumped groundwater beneath one’s land; and 
second, that since Texas follows the rule-of-capture—under which any 
overlying owner can have as much water as it can pump, without any 
responsibility to other owners overlying the same aquifer—it seems 
anomalous to say that landowners have a vested property right in water they 
might never have been able to obtain and use, even in the absence of any 
government restrictions on pumping.2  
Texas is well known for having its own distinctive take on many legal 
issues, so the Day case will likely be of little importance as a precedent in 
western groundwater law.  But the court’s opinion also raised an issue that 
could turn out to be very instructive for understanding a category of 
regulatory takings cases that have long troubled the courts.   
Very briefly stated, the facts in Day were this: in response to 
Endangered Species Act problems created by heavy pumping of the aquifer, 
Texas enacted a statute that imposed limits on extractions, allocating the 
great bulk of the allowable pumping to existing users, with a small 
allocation, largely for domestic use, available to overlying landowners who 
* University of California, Berkeley.
1. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, June 8,
2012.  
2. E.g., Gerald R. Torres, Liquid Assets: Groundwater in Texas, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
143 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/12/4/torres.html. 
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had not historically pumped from the aquifer.  In responding to a takings 
claim by one of those non-pumpers, the court held that the plaintiff had a 
property right in unpumped water under his land, and without quantifying 
that right, opined that the statute had likely deprived such owners of their 
“fair share” of the aquifer’s water, and thus constituted a regulatory taking 
under the Penn Central standard set out by the U.S. Supreme Court.3 
Such a statute would have been very unusual indeed if it had not 
“grandfathered” established uses at the expense of prospective users.  And 
therein lies the real interest of the Texas decision for regulatory takings 
doctrine: the notion of a proprietary “fair share” entitlement to a resource 
that could have been accessed from one’s land, but that was available to 
other landowners as well and—under a legitimate regulatory law—has 
reached its use limits.  The “fair share” concept suggests the usefulness of 
thinking about some regulatory takings disputes not simply in terms of the 
impact of government regulation on the regulated claimant, but the way the 
total entitlement to use of the resource in question had been allocated 
among all the original owners who equally shared it.  
That is not the way fairness has been approached in takings cases4 or 
in the literature.5  From a “fair share” perspective, a question worth asking is 
why it turns out that all the burden of restricted use ends up falling on only 
one or a few owners—late developers, as in the Texas case—rather than 
being shared in some more equitable way by all the owners who have 
utilized the resource, and have created the problem that has generated the 
regulation. 
This dilemma arises with what are usually known as common pool 
resources,6 where a number of individuals have unlimited access and 
entitlement to use (and use up) the resource, and where at some point that 
utilization burdens the resource in an unacceptable way.  An unmanaged 
rule-of-capture aquifer is obviously such a resource, as it is physically and 
legally available to all overlying owners, and at some point of exploitation it 
loses its capacity to sustain long-term use.  But quite a few controversial 
3. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 843.  See generally Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
4. “Fairness” as between the owner and government has long been a central
concern in takings cases.  Virtually, every Supreme Court opinion quotes Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), saying it is inequitable to force “some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.” 
5. See, e.g., infra notes 7, 8.
6. See S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & R.C. Bishop, “‘Common Property’ as a Concept in
Natural Resource Policy,” 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975). 
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regulatory takings situations have that same quality, and could also be 
analyzed in terms of the “fair share” of those owners who share legal access 
to it and can collectively use it up.  It is worth considering some familiar 
regulatory situations with this perspective in mind. 
That land use regulation often seems unfair because it “transfer[s] 
wealth from one class of people, owners of undeveloped land, to another 
class of people, owners of already existing houses” has been noticed and 
well documented.7  The common conclusions drawn from this observation 
are (1) that selfish residents (owners of developed land) are using 
government to advantage themselves at the expense of future residents; (2) 
that it increases housing prices by limiting land use; and (3) that such 
governmentally generated unfairness that should be treated as a 
compensable taking of property.8  
The question I explore here is why we don’t have more of a “fair share” 
property system in common pool resources, the absence of which leads to 
fairness issues when regulation occurs. 
II. Our Non-Fair-Share Legal System
A particularly instructive example is Agins v. Tiburon,9 an open space
downzoning case.  After some years of dense development on very valuable 
land at the edge of San Francisco Bay, the city of Tiburon determined that it 
was running out of open space, and it re-zoned the relatively few remaining 
undeveloped tracts for very low-density development (one to five acres per 
home).  Agins claimed a taking, noting the loss in value he would sustain 
from the downzoning.  The taking issue was never decided because there 
had been no determination as to how density limitation would in fact be 
implemented.  The case nonetheless provides an interesting setting in which 
to think about “fair share” property rights. 
Open space in Tiburon can be seen as analogous to the aquifer in the 
Day case.  At the outset, it is a resource that overlies (rather than underlies) 
each landowner’s tract.  While open space is unlike groundwater in that the 
quantum of each owner’s ability to appropriate is bounded by his tract, it 
parallels the groundwater situation in that a subset of the total owners can 
exhaust the available supply in a way that does not equally reflect each 
owner’s acreage (or some other measure of “fair share”).  While each owner 
can only appropriate open space on his own land, what each owner does on 
7. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 251
(1995). 
8. E.g., Carol Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1125, 1150
(1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 
(1995).  
9. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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that land diminishes a benefit shared by all owners.  That benefit, remaining 
open space, is analogous to the shared benefit of a sustainable groundwater 
supply.  
In addition, as in the groundwater case, the lawfully available supply is 
determined not at the outset, but at some later stage in the developmental 
process.  Also, as under the Texas law in the Day case, all the owners who 
had built on their land before the downzoning are permitted to keep the 
private benefit of the open space they have used up; and only a quite small 
amount of usable open space legally remains for those holding undeveloped 
tracts. 
The open space case differs from the groundwater case in that there is 
no practical way for the owners of existing houses to cut back their existing 
open space consumption in favor of those who haven’t built.  But that does 
not diminish the claim that the available open space was not fairly allocated 
among all landowners at a much earlier stage.  There are devices for such 
allocation in various settings, such as tradable emission rights in air 
pollution regulation, and transferable development rights in land use law. 
Agins is only one example of this species of highly controversial 
common pool regulatory takings cases.  Unlike many conventional cases 
where a regulated owner wants to do something different from his 
neighbors—e.g., put a commercial facility or an apartment house in a single 
family neighborhood—Agins-type cases provoke fairness claims because the 
owner only wants to do what his neighbors have already done.  The same is 
true in wetlands and endangered species cases where only a few owners 
hold all remaining viable habitat.10  It is also the situation in many 
conventional settings: for example, in air pollution regulation where new 
sources have to meet a higher standard than existing ones,11 and in routine 
urban downzoning cases, where existing density of development has created 
congestion, straining road and public transport capacities. 
All such cases bear a relation to the Texas case—and indeed to 
groundwater cases generally—where use of numerous individuals’ tracts 
exhausts some resource value common to a larger population, such as a 
sustainable water supply, open space, freedom from congestion, habitat, or 
air quality.  Whenever such cases arise, and laws address the exhaustion/ 
10. The problem is exacerbated in some Endangered Species Act water cases
where only one user bears the burden of restoring flows to avoid jeopardy because 
the United States prefers to use § 7 (16 U.S.C. § 1536) rather than § 9 (16 U.S.C. § 
1538) of the Act.  Use of the latter provision would permit action against all those 
whose diversions contribute to the “take” of an endangered species.  See HOLLY
DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN 92 (2008).  See also Pac. 
Coast Fed. of Fishermens’ Assn.’s v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 
2005).  
11. See infra note 38, at 11.
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sustainability problem, the affected owners are likely to perceive the 
regulation not as unjustified, or even as necessarily economically excessive, 
but as unfair vis-à-vis their neighbors.  In such cases, the claimants do not 
usually prevail unless their economic loss is very severe.12  The common 
response is that laws inevitably change over time and an owner cannot 
reasonably expect that use rights will remain static while circumstances, 
such as urbanization, new knowledge, and changed public values evolve.   
My purpose here is not to rehash the debate over how much property 
owners ought to be required to adapt to new public values, as compared 
with new versions of established values (the so-called nuisance exception), 
but rather to point out something about such disputes that has gone 
virtually unremarked in takings debates, either by property rights 
proponents or their adversaries. 
It is this: as contrasted with the view expressed by the Texas court in 
the Day case, regulatory takings debates have never revolved around the 
idea that property law should assign a “fair share” of the right to exhaust the 
capacity of resource in question to each of the owners who have the ability 
to exhaust it.  Consequently, regulatory laws burdening only late developers 
have not been challenged on the ground that they deprived those owners of 
their fair share of the resource in question.  The Texas case is extremely 
unusual in basing its takings analysis on that theory. 
The question is an interesting one.  Why isn’t someone like Agins 
entitled to some fair share of the available open space?  If he is, isn’t his 
complaint against his neighbors or against laws that allow them to use more 
than their fair share?  In the Agins situation, a claim against the City of 
Tiburon would probably be a pretty good proxy for the neighbors who used 
up open space.  But in many cases—wetlands, endangered species, and air 
pollution, for example—there is no practical way to identify those who had 
exhausted the resource in question. 
Another difficulty with a fair share theory of ownership is that it works 
best when established at an early stage in the developmental process.  The 
earlier the regulation, the more there is reciprocity of benefit and burden 
among owners, which is one of the hallmarks of fairness.  Part of the 
problem is simply our ability to see the future clearly.  For many resources 
we don’t know what the limits of sustainability or public tolerance are (or 
will be) until we know more and/or have begun to experience problems. 
That is most dramatically illustrated by wetlands, where over many decades 
we moved from subsidizing the filling of such “wasteland” to lamenting the 
loss of a “precious natural heritage.”   
12. Under the dominant Penn Central standard, one of the three controlling
factors is “the economic impact of the regulation on the [landowner].”  438 U.S. at 
124; and total, or near total, economic loss is the determining factor under the per se 
standard in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1016, n.7 (1992). 
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In addition, circumstances change, urbanization having brought 
acceptance of numerous land use regulations that would have seemed 
oppressive in less densely developed places.  Technology also plays an 
important role.  Before electrification easements of light were important to 
landowners.  Then they became unnecessary.  And now solar power has 
revived them as an issue.  
Societal values also change across a spectrum from trivial to 
fundamental: racially restrictive covenants were once standard restrictions 
on landowner’s transactions rights.  Sunday closing laws were once 
pervasive.  Billboards have their day and then become obtrusive.  Climate 
change modifies views about entitlements to coastal development that may 
ultimately burden the community if sea levels rise significantly.   
Moreover, and perhaps at least equally significant, property owners 
tend to resist early establishment of constraints on development (a/k/a 
government planning), partly out of suspicion of government and partly 
from a preference to maintain as much private initiative as possible in 
shaping the landscape, and to allow consumer preferences to reveal 
themselves.   
As the system now functions, early developers benefit from burdening 
resource capacity, but bear no costs when limits on that capacity are 
subsequently imposed.  And except in cases of extreme economic loss, late 
developers get no compensation.13  The ultimate fairness issues in such 
cases are undoubtedly various.  Surely some owners are caught up in fast-
changing circumstances beyond their control or anticipation.  Other late 
developers no doubt take a calculated risk that a potential for greater profit 
as available land diminishes is worth the possibility that new restrictions 
will obliterate that opportunity.  That must be the case with professional 
wetlands developers who continue to purchase such lands despite decades 
of ever-increasing and always-changing restrictive rules, but where such 
lands are often the only remaining open lands in highly developed areas. 
Whatever the facts in any specific case, decades of regulatory takings 
law makes clear—even during eras when the U.S. Supreme Court majority is 
strongly protective of property rights—that no concept of “fair share” 
determines the outcome of Agins-type regulatory takings cases.14  The “fair 
13. As noted at note 30, infra, mitigating strategies such as transferable
development rights are sometimes available. 
14. The underlying facts in Tahoe-Sierra are often cited by property rights
advocates as an example: Wealthy second-home owners created the water quality 
problem, and subsequently development restraints were imposed that largely impact 
small tract owners.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302 (2002). 
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share” rationale underlying the Texas decision in the Day case is thus 
profoundly at odds with American regulatory takings law.15  
III. Our Prior Appropriation Property System
What, then, is the theory that underlies our takings jurisprudence in
Agins-like settings?  The answer, I believe, is a version of what western water 
law calls prior appropriation.  The water in a western river can be taken up 
and used by appropriators until its legally available capacity is exhausted. 
The conventional statement of the theory is “first in time is first in right.” 
Those who are late to develop may find there is nothing left for them either 
because the source is physically exhausted or because some water has been 
reserved to protect instream uses. 
While western river use rights do not arise from landownership,16 the 
same prior appropriation system now also applies to groundwater in most 
western states.17  My point, however, is not to draw a precise analogy from 
   Another example is water pollution, where lax non-point-source standards result in 
the imposition of higher standards on point sources.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) 
(§303(d)).
15. The unitization system in oil and gas on which the Texas court relies did
not arise as a property rights theory, but is the product of legislation enacted at a 
time when oil was overabundant and excess production by competing overlying 
owners was driving prices down.  See Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and 
Unitization: State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 255, 
257 (1986); Richard H. Leach, The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact, A Study in Success, 10 
OKLA. L. REV. 274, 274-75 (1957). 
16. The standard view in appropriation doctrine is that water belongs to the
public, subject to the acquisition of private usufructuary rights.  E.g., Cal. Water Code 
§ 102.
17. Not in Texas, obviously.  A few remnants of riparianism remain elsewhere
in the West, primarily in California, where groundwater law as to non-using overlying 
owners is still unresolved.  Even there the courts have acknowledged that the 
unexercised groundwater right of an overlying owner “if recognized, would “inhibit[] 
long-range planning and investment . . . and foster[] costly and piecemeal litigation.” 
Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 86, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748-49 (1985). 
Such claims, the court said, are “unrecorded, of unknown quantity, with little 
opportunity for control in the public interest, and wasteful to the extent it deters 
others from using water for fear of its ultimate exercise.”  Id.  Nonetheless, courts 
have not yet barred such claims in over-appropriated basins, though in a number of 
Southern California aquifers where negotiated settlements have been effectuated, 
sustainable water allocations have effectively been allocated pro rata to existing 
users.  See WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992). 
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western water law doctrine, but simply to point to the terms and practice it 
employs to describe the way rights in exhaustible resources like open space 
and clean air and density control actually work in practice. 
It is immaterial whether the point of beginning is public ownership 
(rivers), non-ownership (air) or conventional ownership (land).  The 
important point is the allocation of entitlement to the use of such resources 
among the various parties that have legal access to them.  Even if one 
begins with the view that every landowner “owns” the open space or the 
congestion potential implicit in his land, so does every other landowner who 
can impact openness and congestion within the relevant area.  If the 
governing authority has the right to limit those impacts to any extent at all 
without paying compensation (and that is the existing law), the crucial 
question is not whether there are property rights in those uses, but how the 
rights are shared among those owners.  
In practice, prior appropriation governs resource use generally, 
operating to benefit early users at the expense of later users, even though 
that terminology is not used outside the water context.  Even in the East, 
where water was traditionally considered abundant, and where riparian 
doctrine imports a correlative rights (sharing) principle, the fair share idea 
exists more in theory than in practice once shortages appear.18  Existing uses 
(as long as not wasteful) are given a strong preference.  For example, 
Florida’s permit system requires an applicant to demonstrate that his 
proposed use “will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of 
water.”19  Protection of existing uses is also an explicit element of 
reasonableness in water use under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.20  
18. This may be more the case now than it was in the past, and may reflect
response to increasing scarcity.  See, e.g., Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184 (S.Ct. Vt., 
1827), though even then priority was strongly urged as a defense to sharing.  
19. E.g., Fla. Stat. § 373.223(b) (2010).  However, where we now have “managed
riparianism,” effectively a permit system, permit grants can be limited in duration so 
that future re-allocations can be made.  See Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 
1324 (Fla. App., 2d Dist. 1991).  Under western appropriation state permit systems, as 
in California, permits are perpetual, though waste and unreasonable uses can be 
(and are, though rarely) prohibited.  See Water Code §275.  
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A(h) (1979).  The Restatement also
speaks of “the proprietor’s reasonable share of the annual supply or total store of 
ground water,” § 858(1)(b), but there appear to be few if any cases implementing that 
principle.  Oklahoma seems to be alone is allowing overlying owners to receive fixed 
allocations based on percentage of overlying land (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 1020.9 
(West 2012)), and in holding it unconstitutional to convert from a riparian to a prior 
appropriation system, abolishing unused rights, which other western states have 
done.  Contrast Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 
1990), with the general view in the west allowing abolition of riparian rights in favor 
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Prior use is also operatively the governing standard in California’s 
mixed appropriation/riparian system.21  In fact, as far as I have been able to 
determine nationwide, instances in which existing non-wasteful water uses 
must cut back to provide latecomers with a ‘fair share’ are extremely rare.22  
A version of prior appropriation, though not in name, dominates even 
riparian practice. 
The reason seems clear enough.  The legal system is highly averse to 
disappointing expectations based on existing use and existing investment.23  
That is why existing uses are almost always grandfathered when new and 
more stringent regulations come into play (absent some exigent threat, such 
as a health hazard).24  Indeed, retroactive impositions on established 
property rights raise constitutional questions of their own.25   
Land use regulation is the most familiar example of restrictions such 
as new density or height zoning being imposed only for the future.26  Even 
new building code restrictions are routinely imposed only when existing 
of appropriation, e.g., In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 Pac. 1065 (1924); Knight v. 
Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964).  The problem of shifting from a riparian 
to a permit system is explored in the Commentary to § 6R-1-03 of the Regulated 
Riparian Model Water Code (1997).  The Code respects existing withdrawals, and 
provides a method for allocating among existing users if total pumping needs to be 
reduced, § 6R-1-03(5).  Non-users get nothing in such circumstances until the initial 
permits expire.  
21. In several old California cases the courts have protected existing surface
stream users against subsequent interfering pumping of tributary water (surface 
riparian v. groundwater overlying owner): see Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Dev. Co., 
87 Cal. App. 617, 262 P. 425 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1927); McClintock v. Hudson, 141 Cal. 
275, 74 P. 849 (1903); Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910). 
And in City of Lodi v. East Bay M.U.D., the Court protected a prior appropriator of 
percolating groundwater against a subsequent appropriator of surface stream water, 
7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936). 
22. But not unheard of, see supra notes 20 and 21.
23. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulation, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222 (2009). 
24. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 5.78, nn.4, 5 (5th ed., 2003, cum.
Supp. 2011). 
25. See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1998).
26. The general rule is that municipalities may not zone retroactively to
terminate a nonconforming use, Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (Cal. 
1930), and for obvious reasons, as noted earlier, new density requirements are not 
applied to existing development.   
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users want to rebuild or renovate27 and non-conforming uses are only 
gradually amortized away as improvements are made or an existing use has 
been destroyed in a fire.28  
In light of the practical difficulty, and political reluctance, that faces 
efforts to set land use limits early in the development process,29 “fair share” 
allocation of property inevitably gave way to a prior appropriation system. 
Seen this way, late developers who are denied the opportunity to burden 
such resources further can be seen as analogous to an aspirant water 
appropriator who finds the stream or aquifer legally exhausted when he 
seeks to draw on it.  Of course there is an important difference: the water 
system is explicit in adopting priority as the rule; whereas other systems are 
not explicit about how they operate.  Such systems thus generate unfairness 
claims, though it does not take deep analysis to conclude that the system 
has chosen to maximize private developmental initiatives at the expense of 
early government-based land planning, and to favor existing uses and sunk 
investment over after-the-fact reallocation. 
IV. Some (Rare) Examples of “Fair Share”
Prior appropriation has not invariably been the chosen system for
allocating property rights in resources.  But other arrangements almost 
always appear where some overarching authority can impose shared rights 
at an early stage of development.  One example is open space “fair sharing” 
in a planned residential community, such as a large subdivision with a 
condominium structure for common areas, and clustering of buildings to 
preserve open space or habitat.  A similar arrangement can be made for 
density development, which is effectively what cities do when they grant 
downzoned property transferable development rights.30  
Another example of a “fair share” system is found within federal 
reclamation projects, which build dams and reservoirs in order to provide 
water for irrigation, municipal use and hydropower.  Reclamation acquires 
water rights under the prior appropriation system, but then contracts out 
27. See GRANDFATHERING AND BUILDING CODES, http://www.cornerstone-
inspection.com/grandfather.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
28. MANDELKER, supra note 24, at §5.82.
29. Perhaps the most notable example was the failed effort some decades ago
to enact a national land use planning law.  See Jayne E. Daly, A Glimpse of the Past, A 
Vision for the Future: Senator Henry M. Jackson and National Land Use Legislation, 28 URBAN L.
J. 7 (1996).  The Jackson bill was S. 3354, 91st Cong. (2d Sess. 1970).
30. E.g., Penn Central, supra note 3.  However, as has often been noted, if TDRs
are granted relatively late in the developmental process, and all the property has 
already been zoned, a TDR that grants enhanced density rights is effectively taking 
something away from the owners in the transferee district. 
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the water to users who have equal-in-priority rights inter se, so that in times 
of shortage they are all cut back equally proportionately.31  Notably such 
arrangements are imposed at the outset of development and under the 
auspices of a single developer, the Bureau of Reclamation. 
Two other examples of fair share also arise in the context of western 
water law.  The most notable large-scale case is the Colorado River.32  The 
Colorado River Compact of 1922 and later arrangements rejected prior 
appropriation and allocated a share of the river’s anticipated average flows 
first by a division between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin states, and then 
within each of the seven states that share the river.33  It also reserved an 
unquantified amount of water to be allocated subsequently to Mexico, 
which was done by Treaty in 1944.  
For better and worse, that decision is a striking example of government 
resource allocation based on a fair-share theory of entitlement.  California’s 
early development was repudiated as a basis for it to obtain the lion’s share 
of the river.  Nevada got a very small share of the water at a time when Las 
Vegas was barely a hamlet—no one then imagined it would become one of 
the nation’s fastest-growing urban areas.  Even now, nearly a century later, 
some Upper Basin states have not used their full share.  California has had 
to reduce its long-standing uses, Nevada has fallen short of its needs, and 
Arizona has abundant water, some of which it stores up for the future.  But 
every state has its long-ago determined “fair share.”   
Another notable example of “fair share” comes from California water 
laws enacted in response to the massive dam and reservoir projects that 
moved water from the abundant north to the arid and semi-arid south. 
“Area of origin” laws are designed to permit later-developing communities in 
source areas to reclaim water if and when they needed it.34  So far those laws 
have had little impact on prior appropriators in the Central Valley and the 
31. Use rights within the system can usually be marketed, adding further
flexibility to a shared-rights regime 
32. NORRIS HUNDLEY, THE WEST AGAINST ITSELF: THE COLORADO RIVER—AN 
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, IN NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE
NEXT CENTURY 9 (Gary Weatherford & F. Lee Brown, eds., 1986).  The Colorado River 
documents are collected in KATHERINE OTT VERBURG, THE COLORADO RIVER DOCUMENTS 
2008 (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colorado Region 
(September 2010)). 
33. The Upper Basin States are Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico,
and the Lower Basin States are Arizona, California and Nevada. 
34. Ronald B. Robie & Russell R. Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes: The California
Experience, 15 IDAHO L.REV. 419 (1979). 
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urbanized Los Angeles mega-region,35 though some areas of origin have 
begun to assert their statutory rights.36 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the idea of “fair share” as a basis 
for allocating resource capacity is very much at odds with the usual 
American approach to property rights.  Ironically, even the interstate 
apportionment of rivers by the U.S. Supreme Court, which goes under the 
seemingly “fair share” appellation of “equitable apportionment” is powerfully 
dominated by respect for maintenance of existing uses at the expense of 
newly proposed projects.37 
The same is true of the ambient air, and the administration of our air 
pollution laws.  As limits were imposed on emissions, cutbacks of existing 
uses were imposed in order to reach acceptable concentrations of 
pollutants.  In non-attainment areas, proposed new sources are required to 
meet a higher standard (lowest achievable emission rate) and to more than 
offset any emission increases their activity would create,38 which they can do 
by shutting down some existing emitter.  No historic non-emitter is entitled 
to a fair share of the total extant emissions, but economic growth is 
encouraged by allowing a market in emission reduction to operate. 
V. Conclusion
Insofar as regulation of later-developing owners in settings like Agins
seems unfair, such outcomes are generated by our first-come, first-served, 
prior appropriation system.  The problem is not that a regulated owner never 
had any property interest in the resource in question.  Nor is it that some 
entitlement unique to him has been taken away by the government.  It is 
rather that there is nothing left when he comes to use some of it.   
If the total resource—let us say it was 100 open space use units—had 
been equally divided among ten landowners (with each having a right to buy 
or sell allotments), and at some later date the city had limited total open 
space utilization to ninety units, few if any courts would treat that late-stage 
restriction as a taking, even if open space regulation was quite a new thing. 
That being the case, whatever sense of unfairness open space ordinances 
generate in Agins-type cases would seem to derive not from the restriction 
itself, but from the way in which those use-units were allocated.  
35. See THOMPSON, ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 242 (5th ed. 2013).
36. E.g., Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. Dept. of the Interior, 819 F. Supp. 2d
956 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
37. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico (II), 467 U.S. 310 (1984); but the Court
says priority should not be strictly applied where it would work hardship, Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 619 (1945).  
38. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a) (2012).
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Many observers see no unfairness even under the present system, 
believing that owners in a ‘race to the swift’ system should be prepared for 
unpredictable changes, and that even extreme losses call for no 
compensation.  But that is not the way takings law has developed.  While 
Justice Antonin Scalia is the most prominent contemporary advocate of a 
diminution of value test to measure compensability,39 he is not alone. 
Justice Holmes also said that regulation, if too onerous, might qualify as a 
compensable taking.40  Thus, while “fair share” has never functioned as the 
constitutional standard, economic loss has served as an indicator for some 
broader notion of fairness courts are seeking in takings cases.41   
Since most regulated parties in Agins-like downzoning situations do 
not prevail in their takings claims unless their economic loss is very 
extensive, a reasonable conclusion is that courts have tacitly acknowledged 
the first-in-time system as a defense to a takings claim so long as the loss is 
not too severe.  While basing compensation on diminution of value is 
plainly not a satisfactory theoretical basis for a constitutional standard,42 
there may be another explanation for judicial attention to the extent of 
economic loss.   
Courts recognize that our prior appropriation system can produce 
inequitable outcomes for some late-stage developers subject to newly 
enacted restrictions.  That being the case, compensating only those whose 
losses have been quite severe, and giving weight to other ‘soft’ factors like 
the unexpectedness of regulation for some activity,43 the lack of opportunity 
to take adaptive measures, and the absence of conduct wrongful in itself; 
39. See supra note 12.
40. Though Holmes rarely decided cases on that basis.  See Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 43 (1964). 
41. See supra note 4.
42. If 100% loss is compensable, why not 95%, and if 95%, why not 75% or 55%?
See Justice Scalia’s observation in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8.  The same dilemma 
arises under the diminution element of the Penn Central tripartite standard. 
43. An interesting empirical question is whether owners who are more or less
surprised by a newly enacted standard are more likely to get compensation than 
those who arguably ought to have seen it coming, even though the specific 
restriction was only recently specifically applied to them.  For example, wetlands 
regulations discouraging the use of such lands have been around for more than four 
decades, even though the detailed rules keep changing.  By contrast open space 
zoning was quite new when the Agins case first arose, and the prior practice had been 
for government to buy open space easements.  Indeed, there were efforts to do so in 
Tiburon prior to the downzoning.  See generally, James C.N. Paul & Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, 
The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L.REV. 179 (1961). 
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might provide the basis for something we could describe as compassionate 
constitutionalism; not “fair share,” but fairness as a kind of rough justice. 
In light of the decades-long and fruitless search for doctrinal solutions 
to the takings issue both by courts and scholars, the time might be ripe for 
transition to an openly situational approach to the problem.  The rather 
fuzzy tripartite Penn Central standard44 is quite amenable to use for this 
purpose, with a more or less implicit recognition that the question is 
whether the claimant has been hit so hard, and with so little warning, or 
opportunity to adapt or adjust, that denying compensation seems unfair. 
Under such an approach, it may well turn out that the ‘widows and orphans’ 
type cases that property rights advocates are so fond of ferreting out would 
do quite well, while the complaints of large-scale and sophisticated 
developers would usually fare poorly.  Maybe that wouldn’t be such a bad 
way of doling out fairness in the property realm. 
44. See supra note 12.
